|A crude photo of Zucker from the post-publication full page publisher's advert of his 1945 Philosophy of American History in The New Republic. |
“Whether or not historical events are causality connected or are the result of chance, accident or mathematical probability are much more than abstract speculations. Their answer goes to the very root of the historian’s method of procedure. Of what would it avail us, if after all our labor, the reader were to agree that while strict causality has been proved in all past history, the future must be shrouded in darkness, or is controlled by chance? One may be convinced that historical laws are controlled by laws, but conclude that these laws are not causal, but indeterminate in nature.”
In the first volume, subtitled Historical Field Theory, Zucker outlines what he calls historical field theory—a term themed on the “great physical theories of the electromagnetic field as developed by Einstein into the relativity theory, with its vast philosophical possibilities”, as he says—in aims to upgrade the soft science ranking of history into the hard science ranking comparable to chemistry and physics, and in the second volume Periods in American History, described as rather “extensive history of the United States”, he applies his theory to the analysis of history. 
Zucker cites and discusses the physical sociology work of Pitirim Sorokin; the downfall of the technocracy movement of Howard Scott, which he describes as a type of pseudoscience, being that it employed "mysterious and pompous vernacular"; classifies James Jeans, Arthur Eddington, and Alfred Whitehead as the "metaphysical school" of the physical knowledge of reality; among others.
The following is the publisher’s abstract—Arnold-Howard Publishing—of Zucker’s Historical Field Theory, in two-volumes: 
“The type is clear, readable 11 on 12 point Baskerville; page size 6x9; over 1,800 pages. In volume one, entitled Historical Field Theory, the methods of all the great writers, past and present are subjected to critical analysis. The education of each of the six principles upon which the theory is based, a complete chapter is devoted. The final chapter summarizes the entire argument. Chapter four on law in social movement is an exhaustive analysis of Dewey’s position, and that of Croce, Teggart, Barnes, Robinson, Sorokin, Boas, Goldenweiser, Nevins, Cheyney, among others. Chapter seven on causality or indeterminacy in history considers the contributions of modern scientific thought to historical inquiry—Planck’s quantum theory, Einstein’s, relativity theory, and Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy. In this discussion Zucker rises to the heights of his intellectual powers.
Volume two, the Periods in American History, is a truly great original work in a familiar field. Zucker’s discussion of the colonial period, the period of expansion, the period of industrialization, the present period fo nationalization; his study on the origin and development of definite state forms, of specific modes of economy, and dominant ideologies gives new meaning to old facts. From it all is evolved Dr. Zucker’s special ‘theory of the continuing American revolution’, which will remain his lasting contribution to the understanding of our history.”
On the dissection and nature of social forces, Zucker states the following: 
“Habits tend to mechanize social existence, but are themselves gradually modified by the social institutions which give rise to modifiable instincts, customs, rules of conduct and forms of thought. All react upon and modify habits, being in turn controlled by them. Desires change with the nature of the obstacles encountered while intelligence operates on thought to affect necessary accommodations in conduct.
Social movement involves the concept of social forces. Now no one has been able to dissect a social force or subject it to chemical re-agents. Bodies move, or are prevented from moving because forced is exerted upon them. Forces are developed from the relations of bodies rather than by being superimposed upon them from some outside agency. If this outside agency is strong enough to affect another body, then both bodies exist in relation to each other and exert influence upon each other through fields of force between them. This fundamental principle applies to society.”
Physical science | References
A salient point to note, in regards to Zucker’s continuous thematic overly-sounding official effort to divulge or uncover the “laws of motion” of history, to make a “field theory” of history, to make a science of history on par with chemistry and physics, and so on, into the midpoint (page 388) of volume one, the only two actual physical science like books that Zucker reoccurringly cites is Albert Einstein’s 1935 The World As I See It and Einstein and Leopold Infeld’s 1938 The Evolution of Physics: the Growth of Ideas from Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta. 
Beard | Test-tube theory of history
In commentary on American historian Charles Beard’s 1936 chemical analogy argument against causation in history, Zucker comments: 
“The whole ‘test-tube’ theory of history is fallacious, because to begin with there is no such test-tube nor is there the possibility of creating one. The specific processes of investigation applicable to chemistry are not those of history.”
Zucker goes on to list his objections to Beard’s eleventh chemical argument:
“No modern chemist, if he is vitally concerned with this experiment as Beard is in discovering the causes of war, would be content with the empirical knowledge that the eleventh chemical somehow did the trick, either by itself, or in activating others. He would want to know just why and how the precipitation came about. He would want to know whether he must always use all of the eleven chemicals the way that he did, or if simpler combinations could effect the desired result. In history, Beard contends, we have an analogous situation. There are ten know factors. An eleventh, let us say, the German unrestricted submarine warfare is added. War is declared. Was that the cause of war? No one knows. Furthermore it is impossible to know.”
Zucker, in any event, then goes on to list ten questions to Beard about his notion of “ten factors in the historical retort” (see: retort).
|Left: a 2002 chart of "causes" of forest fires. Right: Germans fighting Norwegians in 1940 a war or one might say social fire, supposedly, "caused" be Jewish refugee Herschel Grynszpan.|
Regarding Zucker's "no one knows the cause of war" statement, above, American-born English physicist Mark Buchanan argues that Bosnian Serbian Gavrilo Princip, on 28 Jun 1914 at 11AM “caused” World War I, when he shot Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand.  Likewise, the so-called “Crystal Night” of 9 Nov 1938 when 17-year-old Jewish refugee Herschel Grynszpan shot German diplomat Ernst vom Rath is said to have been one of the causative "sparks" to World War II.
Both of these causative sparks, according to Adolf Hitler's 1925 so-called "torch of the spoken word" theory, to put things into perspective, may be considered akin to the cause of a deadly forest fire having been started by a careless camper throwing out a cigarette butt or alternatively by a lightening bolt strike. The real issue, necessarily, is not "how" or who started the fire (or war) but to note that the system (forest or global community) was at critical state of dryness or near the tip of the activation energy barrier and subsequently combustion (hydrocarbon or social) would have been started regardless.
Historically, forest fires were caused naturally by lightning, but now most forest fires are caused by humans. Originally, forest fire philosophy was that fires were bad and should be prevented from happening in ecosystems—the same way that many now believe that war is band and should be prevented from happening in social ecosystems. Up into the 1920s, laws were enacted to suppress forest fires. It was not until the 1930s that scientists began to challenge the practice of eliminating fire from natural ecosystems. After much debate, the practice of intentionally igniting wildland fires and permitting naturally-occurring fires to burn was adopted. The practice of so-called “managed fires” have since been shown to have increased benefits.  Likewise, the practice of “managed wars”, i.e. permitting naturally-occurring wars to burn will likely be adopted, over the current utopian peace ideals or “make love not war” mottos.
The following is a hilarious comparison done by Zucker, citing a quote by Austrian sociologist and economist Paul Weisengruen, a critic of the so-called materialistic conception of history, as advocated by Karl Marx: 
|Zucker points out that just as the chemist or engineer doesn't need to know the so-called love life or wills of every single proton (+) or happy particle, above, or electron (-) or sad or angry particle above, in order to make successful predictions so to does the historian not need to know the love life or wills of every single person in history to make predictions. |
“Leaving aside the problem of causality or indeterminacy, the theory and practice of science has been that if given an initial state with whose properties we are familiar, and if we know the laws of nature applicable to it, we can predict its future state by virtue of the operation of these laws. The diversity of historical phenomena [and] its apparently lawless and contradictory mode of manifestation, the bewildering reactions of countless human wills in different circumstances and different lands, that gives color to the theory that a science of history is impossible. ‘The historian’, writes Weisengruen ironically, ‘must know all the persons of the period he describes, their family relations, their actual course of action, as well as the opinions they held of each other … All to the smallest detail.’  The chemist and the engineer arrive at quite exact results in their operations and their predictions without knowing the love-life of every single electron and proton of the materials with which they work.”
The historian, supposedly, must come to understand the "reactions of countless wills" to make historical prediction, whereas the chemist and engineer (or chemical engineer) are able to predict successfully without recourse to physical anthropomorphisms such as the wills or love lives of electrons and protons.
Later, likewise, in commentary on the so-called “individualism argument” of historians such as Thomas Carlyle, against the possibility of completing a complete analysis of history, Zucker gives the following comparison: 
“Carlyle and the others contend that the knowledge of every act and thought of every individual of a given time must be clearly analyzed, and their permutations understood in order to write history. But by the same token we would never be able to understand the time in which we write. Is a metallurgist in a steel mill debarred from understanding the nature of the processes he himself starts, regulates and controls because he cannot give a graphic chart depicting the actions of ever electron of every atom of all the materials he works with, and therefore cannot predict the end results of his operations? But we have gone over this ground before.”
Somewhere along the way, Zucker himself makes some predictions about a post-war boom, which he says will be followed by crisis and unemployment, then eventually a third world war, being that, as American Historian Roy Nicholas summarizes things, "war is the perpetual state of modern capitalistic economy".
|Zucker states that in order to develop a proper science of history we need to study society, as a type social matter, using a microscope and retort.|
Retorts and microscopes
See main: Social retortIn commentary on American philosopher John Dewey's reasons why a science of history is impossible, Zucker comments the following: 
“Physical phenomena in the gross is not concerted with the internal structure of each atom in each successive moment, nor is history with the relation of each individual being every moment of time. History is vitally interested in the laws of continuity in finite space and definite time. Were it not for the existence of these laws developed from definite relations subsisting among the mass, all science would be impossible.
These propositions are fundamental in physics, and they apply with equal footing in history. Society is a definite reality. All we have to do is to look about us to be conscious of its ubiquitous presence though no one yet has examined it under the microscope or tested it in a chemists’ retort. The retort will be that we are comparing inert matter, iron, with a living reality, society. Matter [after all] is not so terribly inert.”
After citation of the final section from American historian Henry Adams’ ninth volume of his History of the United States, wherein he seems to allude to the second law, Zucker states the following: 
“The second law of thermodynamics in history belongs to the drawing room intellectuals to be settled between cups of tea or cocktails.”
Though dismissive of the second law, as something to be settled in the future, Zucker does say he will discuss this in his section on causality. Later he discusses irreversibility as follows: 
“Can we reconstruct the events of a past day, or of a by-gone civilization? Certainly not. No phenomena, physical, organic or social, can be reconstructed in exactly the same way as it originally existed. The second law of thermodynamics deals with organization in time [and] offers an insurmountable obstacle to that achievement.”
Free will and freedom
The following is a circa 1932 Socratic dialog between Irish translator James Murphy and German-born American physicist Albert Einstein on the question of free will and freedom, as found in Zucker’s section on free will versus determinism in history: 
“Murphy: I have been collaborating with our friend, Planck, on a book which deals principally with the problem of causation and the freedom of the human will.
Einstein: Honestly, I cannot understand what people mean when they talk about the freedom of the human will. I have a feeling, for instance, that I will do something or other; but what relation this has with freedom I cannot understand at all. I feel that I will light up my pipe and I do it; but how can I connect this up with the idea of freedom? What is behind the act of willing to light the pipe? Another act of willing? Schopenhauer once said: Man can do what he wills, but cannot will what he wills.
Murphy: But it is now the fashion in physical science to attribute something like free will even to the routine processes of organic nature.
Einstein: That nonsense is not merely nonsense. It is objectionable nonsense.”
Murphy, to note, is introduction section writer of German physicist Max Planck’s 1933 Where is Science Going?, wherein the above dialog shown is found, and also translator of Austrian physicist Erwin Schrodinger's 1935 Science and the Human Temperament.
The Schopenhauer quote, repeated by Einstein, to note, comes from German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer’s 1839 Essay on the Freedom of the Will, which in turn is based on his mentor German polyintellect Johann Goethe’s 1809 chemical reaction affinity force theory of the will, both scholars, Schopenhauer and Goethe, forming a large portion of Einstein's personal library.
American historian Roy Nichols gave the following synopsis of the book in his 1945 review: 
“Countless individuals have pondered on the meaning of the conglomeration of actions which make up history. Of this vast throng, relatively few
have undertaken to reduce their thoughts to written formula. In the midst of busy lives even fewer could ever have done what Dr. Zucker has done.
Despite the fact of another profession, he has not only read widely and thought long but he has written seventeen hundred pages detailing his views at length.”
“[Zucker’s] positive interest is the new physics of Einstein and his twentieth-century associates. He believes that history like matter is made up of fields of force which have definite and predictable relationships, and of lines of force which can be traced in the past and projected into the future so that the historian may prophesy.”
This is very interesting, to say the least!
In 1946, American physical sociologist George Lundberg, noted for his "proton-electron configuration" view of humans, did a review of Zucker's work in The Scientific Monthly entitled “Theoretical Aspects of History.” 
Zucker’s role model exemplar, in the writing of his two volume set, is American physical science historian Henry Adams, who developed his own physical theory of history based on chemistry, physics, and thermodynamics, and then to satisfy his own amusement sought to prove, by the physical means of his theories that cause and effect exists in history, via the penning of a 12-volume history of America, which is summarized by Adams—in his famous The Education of Henry Adams—cited by Zucker in his opening pages, as follows: 
“Historians undertake to arrange sequences—called stories, or histories—assuming in silence a relation of cause and effect … He had even published a dozen volumes of American history for no other purpose than to satisfy himself whether, by the severest process of stating, with the least possible comment, such facts as seemed sure, in such order as seemed rigorously consequent, he could fix for a moment a necessary sequence of human movement. Where he saw sequence, other men say something quite different, and no one saw the same unit of measurement.”
Zucker refers to Adams as the “greatest stylist American historical writing has produced”. Zucker's work containes a comparatively—compared to Adams—large number of physical science concepts, applied to history, chapter subsections, including: social forces, second law, relativity, uncertainty principle, quantum mechanics, among others, with digressions on free will, determinism, chucked full of what seems to a large number of ripe and rare quotes by leading thinkers.
|Left: chemist shown with blowpipe, a simple devise through which air is forced through the tube by means of the lungs to forcefully add oxygen to a flame, increasing it's heat, producing temperatures high enough to melt small amounts of gold, alloys and solders (Ѻ). Right: chemist holding reactants in a test tube over a flame. Zucker criticizes American historian Allan Nevins, who claims (1938) that history can never be a science because historians have no blowpipes or test tubes with which to conduct controlled experiments. |
Nevins | On nature
See also: One nature; Two natureThe following is a noted quote by Zucker from his Historical Field Theory, about the non-duality nature of nature: 
“Allan Nevins is added to the long list who contend that, strictly speaking, history cannot be a science, if only because its phenomena cannot be repeated and tested as a chemist does his compounds. Historical events never precisely duplicate themselves. he writes:‘Hence it is that we can have no precise laws in history as we have precise laws in physics, chemistry and mathematics; that history can never be a science in that highly rigid sense … the chemist, for example, can boast a superior apparatus for ascertaining the truth. In formulating the laws which govern an element, he can repeat his experiments thousands of times with all the factors precisely the same, or with endless variations of factors. The historian has no control of phenomena in the blowpipe (Ѻ) or test tube sense.’
First, as to the chemical analogy, Nevins is somewhat antiquated in his illustration. The time element which he says militates against history becoming a science because of time’s arrow, also operates in chemistry. Nature knows no duality of law as to the flow of time—one for physics, the other for that physical state we call society, and it’s historical phenomena.”
Zucker, as we see here, is pretty sharp. This of course echos Goethe's advertisement, and his subtle notice, in respect to comparisons between human and chemical behavior, that "there is, after all, only one nature."
Zucker seems to have a doctorate in something, as he is commonly referred to as "Dr. Zucker". 
It is difficult to pin down exactly what Zucker's religious position is? Despite his overt aim to construct a determinist “science of history” akin to chemistry and physics so to discern the "laws of social motion", he does give indication of a certain underlying religious belief, e.g. mentioning God on fifty or so pages, though in a somewhat ambiguous way, e.g. mentioning things such as “father Abraham”, “Indian branch of God’s children”, etc., while at the same time seemingly being an evolutionist, e.g. spending a large amount of time discussing Herbert Spencer, referring to Charles Darwin as one of the great men, alongside Galileo and Newton. The following, in commentary on American law professor Thurman Arnold’s 1935 The Symbols of Government, seems to typify a Dawkins number one mindset: “Infinitely more blood has been shed concerning the symbols of Christianity than in its content, or in promoting the spirit of that mode of life which Jesus so beautifully exemplified by his own.”  A point to note here is that a showing Zucker’s belief system is laminated by a coating of tentative or possible analogy; for example, after stating the following ripe paragraph: 
“The tragedy of society’s present dilemma is intensified by the fact that the analysts become extremely cautious when it comes to the all-important question of the future. What, they ask would you expect a blue-print of the future? And each smiles in self-satisfaction at this conclusive retort. We hasten to add that non but engineers could draw such blue-prints—social engineers—and the first thing any engineer demands is exact knowledge about his materials and of the problem at hand. He must know how events developed, and why, and he must understand exactly the nature of the social laws with which he deals, the social forces which create those laws, and the social structure wherein those aggregates operate.”
To this, he follows with incredulously statement that by the phrase “begin analysis in [the] scientific fashion” we do not mean “ that everyone who undertakes to write a book on the modern corporation must begin with Adam and Eve.” Here, it is hard to tell if Zucker is jibing, joking, or if he actually believes that the first to humans were Adam and Eve? Whatever the case, i.e. whether he is thinking here figuratively or literally, we might be so inclined to posit Zucker as Dawkins number = 1 in belief system.
The following are noted adverts for Zucker's book:
“What Einstein did for physics, what Darwin did for biology, Morris Zucker has now done for the field of history in a work hailed as one of the truly great original achievements of our times.”This tribute, however, is a bit overzealous; while Zucker's first volume is an interesting read, advocating physical history theory, his work pales in comparison to say, for example, Henry Adams, who seems to be one of Zucker's intellectual idols or roll models; and it can hardly be said that Zucker is a social Newton; nor was he a “social Einstein”, though he might have had some remote idea like this in his mind—authors, in 1955, in fact were still saying that “the ‘social Einstein’ may not yet be born.” (Ѻ)— Anon (c.1945), in: Willson Coates' 1945 review: "The Philosophy of American History by Morris Zucker" 
|Zucker's two-volume The Philosophy of American History, volume one: The Field Theory of History (left), volume two: Periods in American History (right); see also power center. |
Second Volume | Periods in American History
At the closing page of volume one—A Field Theory of History—the previous 685-pages seemingly being a Hegelian-Marx dialectical fence sitter like gallop on the plausibility of a physics-chemistry stylized, modeled, or framed science of history, Zucker gives the following connecting link to the aim of the second volume—Periods in American History—of another 1,054-pages of discussion:
“There is now left the essential test of their [terms, field of social forces, origin of social forces, manifestation of social forces, on the basis of causal law] proof in the facts of American history from its very beginning, and the final application of the historical field principles in the forecast of our future within the limitations of the present historical field.”
One salient point to note about all of this discussion of “historical field principles”, “historical field theory”, “historical field”, etc., Zucker never once explicitly stated once in the preceding 685-pages what exactly his “historical field theory” is, but rather seems to but fence sit on every single topic he discusses, though it seems leaning slightly to the materialist side of the lawn; and beyond this, for all his opening boasting about Planck’s quantum, the Schrodinger equation, Maxwell’s electromagnetic field, and Einstein’s theory of relativity, none of this ever makes its way into any semblance of a “field theory” that can be used in history studies. Very odd indeed. It’s almost as though he was laying out some type of draft for some type of future ideology along these lines. The opening sentence to the preface of the second volume seems to given evidence to this supposition:
“Both Buckle and Henry Adams were convinced that to develop the laws of historical movement, it would be necessary to study its phenomena in comparative freedom from extraneous influences.”
Needless to say, at this point, Zucker is no Henry Buckle or Henry Adams, though it seems, he wanted to be.
Quotes | Misc
The following are noted quotes by Zucker or found within his Historical Field Theory:
“It is a characteristic faculty of the Germans to look in the clouds for what lies at their feet.”References— Arthur Schopenhauer (date), Essay on Government (pg. 29) “Man is not born a blank (see: tabula rasa Ѻ); he has a rich heritage behind and before him which he inherits and acquires; that religion, morality, ethical conceptions, propaganda, race, politics, nationalism, prejudice, love, hatred, fear and all the rest are vital elements which enter into the motivations of that glorious complex we call man.”— Morris Zucker (1945), synopsis of Karl Marx’s view individuals (pg. 302)
“Science deals with facts, not ideas developed out of suppositions. History must go a step further, just as modern physics does, and inquire about the forces which bring forth those events. Knowing something about social forces will tell us why some of the things imagined could not have taken place because they were impossible, and others were so remote as to be extremely improbable.”— Morris Zucker (1945), on discarding the “if” theory of science (pg. 322)
“A yardstick is still a yard, but the yardstick itself undergoes changes of length dependent upon its position relative to the earth’s motion.”— Morris Zucker (1945), on the Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction (pg. 556) 
“To the extent that a field of inquiry succeeds in eliminating the personal equation, to that degree does it claim a place among the hierarch of the scientific disciplines.”— Morris Zucker (1945), on scientific disciplines (pg. 630)
“Purpose pertains to man, not to nature, and man’s purposes are often shrouded in mystery, even to himself. We will leave out all theological or eschatological considerations, since they germinate from theories steeped in religion, destiny or final cause or purpose of existence.”— Morris Zucker (1945), commentary on some who have ascribed purpose to history (pg. 638)
“Physics, chemistry, and biology afford ample proof that beyond a certain point quantitative differences bring about radical qualitative changes. So it is in society.”— Morris Zucker (1945), on laws of social relations (pg. 640)
“The chemist, the metallurgist, the astronomer, the economist need not be conversant with the permutations of every single electron of the masses with which they deal. That does not justify the chemist in expecting to squeeze rabbits out of a hatful of water, nor does the metallurgist propose to run milk out of his blast furnace.”— Morris Zucker (1945), on probability laws in physics (pg. 678)
“A mistake of mechanical engineering results in limited loss; but a mistake in social engineering often spells irretrievable social disaster.”— Morris Zucker (1945), on whose in hands social affairs are to be placed (pg. 682)
1. (a) Zucker, Morris. (1945). The Philosophy of American History: The Historical Field Theory. Arnold-Howard Publishing Co.
(b) Zucker, Morris. (1945). The Philosophy of American History: Periods in American History. Arnold-Howard Publishing Co.
(c) Anon. (1945). “American’s Destiny”, Free World (pg. 90; “amazingly erudite”, pg. 90). Publisher.
2. (a) Adams, Henry. (1907). The Education of Henry Adams (pg. 382). Publisher.
(b) Zucker, Morris. (1945). The Philosophy of American History: The Historical Field Theory (Adams, pg. 5). Arnold-Howard Publishing Co.
3. Zucker, Morris. (1945). The Philosophy of American History: The Historical Field Theory (clouds, pg. 7; retort, pg. 170; Adam and Eve, pg. 434, Jesus, pg. 441; causality, pg. 510; social forces, pgs. 627-28). Arnold-Howard Publishing Co.
4. (a) Nichols, Roy F. (1945). “Book Review: The Philosophy of History”, Journal, pgs. 330-31.
(b) Roy Franklin Nichols – Wikipedia.
5. (a) Zucker, Morris. (1945). The Philosophy of American History: The Historical Field Theory (clouds, pg. 7; no duality, pg. 531). Arnold-Howard Publishing Co.
(b) Planck, Max. (1933). Where is Science Going? (pg. 201). Allen & Unwin.
(c) James Vincent Murphy – Wikipedia.
6. Nussbaum, F.L. (1945). “The Philosophy of American History by Morris Zucker” (JSTOR) (abs), The Journal of Modern History, 17(3):274.
7. Lundberg, George A. (1946). “Theoretical Aspects of History.” (Book Reviews: The Philosophy of American History) (JSTOR), The Scientific Monthly, 62(2):179-80.
8. Coates, Willson H. (1945). "The Philosophy of American History by Morris Zucker" (abs), Book Review, The American Historical Review, 51(1):125-29.
9. (a) Weisengruen, Paul. (1900). Der Marxismus und das Wesen der sozialen Frage. Leipzig.
(b) Boudin, Louis. (1907). The Theoretical System of Karl Marx (pg. 47). Charles H. Kerr & Co.
(c) Zucker, Morris. (1945). The Philosophy of American History: The Historical Field Theory (pgs. 49-50). Arnold-Howard Publishing Co.
10. (a) Nevins, Allan. (1938). The Gateway to History (blowpipe, pg. 46). Quadrangle Books, 1962.
(b) Allan Nevins – Wikipedia.
(c) Zucker, Morris. (1945). The Philosophy of American History: The Historical Field Theory (Nevins, pg. 199). Arnold-Howard Publishing Co.
11. (a) Adams, Henry. (date). History of the United States, Volume 9 (pgs. 241-2). Publisher.
(b) Zucker, Morris. (1945). The Philosophy of American History: The Historical Field Theory. Arnold-Howard Publishing Co.
12. Zucker, Morris. (1945). The Philosophy of American History: The Historical Field Theory (metallurgist, pg. 166; second law, pg. 238). Arnold-Howard Publishing Co.
13. (a) Beard, Charles A. (1936). The Devil Theory of War: an Inquiry into the Nature of History and the Possibility of Keeping Out of War (pdf) (pg. 14). Vanguard Press.
(b) Zucker, Morris. (1945). The Philosophy of American History: The Historical Field Theory (pgs. 295, 298). Arnold-Howard Publishing Co.
14. Buchanan, Mark. (2000). Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen (pg. 3). Three Rivers Press.
15. Fires – Western North Carolina Vitality Index.
16. (a) Einstein, Albert. (1935). The World As I See It. Book Tree, 2007.
(b) Einstein, Albert and Infeld, Leopold. (1938). The Evolution of Physics: the Growth of Ideas from Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta. CUP Archive, 1961.
(c) The Evolution of Physics – Wikipedia.
17. (a) Zucker, Morris. (1945). “American History” (photo, pg. 656), The New Republic, Volume 113.
(b) Note: Scan of page 656 of volume 113, thanks to Stephanie Dodge, a communications associate of The New Republic, sent to Libb Thims (14 Nov 2013).
(c) Note: Photo is difficult to obtain, being that back covers, where Zucker's photo is found, are not scan-archived in either Google Books nor The New Republic online archives.
18. (a) Jeans, James. (1932). The Mysterious Universe (ch. 4). Publisher.
(b) Eddington, Arthur. (1928). The Nature of the Physical World (ch. 1). Publisher.
(c) Zucker, Morris. (1945). The Philosophy of American History: The Historical Field Theory (pg. 546). Arnold-Howard Publishing Co.
● Zucker, Morris (b.1892-) – WorldCat Identities.